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PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. HEPPS: A LOGICAL
PRODUCT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES REVOLUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The common law of defamation evolved in political surroundings
entirely different from those that nurtured the constitutional values of
free speech and press.' Because of their inherent incompatability, rec-
onciling the constitutional interests of freedom of expression with a
state's interest in protecting an individual's reputation has proven to be
a formidable task for the Supreme Court.
Before the Court drastically altered the law of defamation with its
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 libelous statements received
no protection from the first amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press.3 The common law protected an individual's
interest in the enjoyment and maintenance of his reputation by affording
a civil cause of action under which the publisher of a defamatory state-
ment faced a standard of strict liability.4 Regardless of his good faith
belief in the truth of the defamatory statement, the defendant incurred
liability unless he could prove that the statement was either true or
privileged.
5
This "recipient-centered" concept 6 focused on the effect that the
speech had on the receiver rather than on the conduct of the sender.
General damage was presumed, allowing a private citizen defamed by an
unprivileged communication to recover absent proof of special harm to
his reputation. 7 In addition, although falsity was an essential element to
1. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151 (1967). For a general discussion
of the historical development of defamation law see W. KEETON, B. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 111 at 771-73 (5th ed. 1984); see also ROSENBERG,
PROTECTING THE BEST MAN (1986) ("An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel").
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(public official cannot recover in a defamation action against a
media defendant absent showing of actual malice).
3. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (dictum); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113 (4th ed. 1971) (citing Hulton
& Co. v. Jones, [1909] 2 K.B. 44, aff'd C.A. 20 (1910)). In the beginning of this century,
Justice Holmes applied strict liability in Peck v. Tribune, 214 U.S. 185 (1909), where the
Chicago Sunday Tribune, instead of placing the picture of a female nurse who regularly
drank whiskey, accidentally placed a picture of a nurse who did not drink whiskey in a
testimonial advertisement for Duffy's Pure Malt Whiskey. Holmes wrote:
[I]f the advertisement obviously would hurt the plaintiff in the estimation of an
important and respectable part of the community, liability is not a question of
majority vote. We know of no decision in which this matter is discussed upon
principle. But obviously an unprivileged falsehood need not entail universal
falsehood in order to constitute a cause of action.
Id. at 190 (quoted in C. LAWTHORNE, THE SUPREME COURT AND LIBEL 10 (1981)).
5. W. PROSSER § 113.
6. See generally Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and
Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 828 (1984) (harm to be redressed is determined by
recipient's reaction to speaker's words).
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White,J., dissenting) (pre-
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
the cause of action, truth was regarded as an absolute defense in civil
cases. 8 The plaintiff was, therefore, not required to prove falsity.
The common law approach to defamation maintained a reverence
for the value of an individual's reputation.9 Justice Stewart eloquently
described this recognition of an individual's interest in his reputation in
Rosenblatt v. Baer:' 0 "The right of a man to the protection of his own
reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being - a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty."''
Beginning with New York Times, however, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the first amendment raises a barrier to the unqualified
protection of an individual's reputation. ChiefJustice Holmes captured
the essential nature of free expression in his statement that "[t]he main-
tenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to
the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitu-
tional system."'
2
In its struggle to accommodate the seemingly irreconcilable values
of free speech and protection of an individual's dignity from defamatory
statements, the Supreme Court has established an array of standards to
be applied in determining the constitutional protection of expressions
by organizations and individuals. These standards are based on the type
of speech and the nature of the parties. 13 However, in its quest to estab-
lish the boundaries of constitutional protection, the Court has remained
virtually silent on a crucial aspect of every defamation action - the bur-
den of proving the truth or falsity of a defamatory statement. This criti-
cal issue was addressed and resolved in the recent decision of
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.
14
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Onset of the Revolution
In its 1964 decision, New York Times v. Sullivan, 15 the Supreme Court
sumption of damage was the typical scheme under state defamation law). See, e.g., James v.
Fort Worth Telegram Co., 117 S.W. 1028 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
8. GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER § 351, 152 (8th ed. R. McEwen & P. Lewis 1981).
9. See B. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY 15-21 (1985); see generally Lovell,
The"Reception" of Defamation By the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1501 (1962) (outlines
history of libel and slander through early England, explaining the reasons for the ultimate
division of defamation into two distinct torts).
10. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
11. Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
12. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
13. See generally Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 7 (1975) (outlining the Court's defama-
tion decisions from New York Times to Gertz).
14. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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adopted a powerful reading of the first amendment that dramatically re-
structured the law of libel. In New York Times, L. B. Sullivan, the police
commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a libel suit against
four Alabama clergymen and the New York Times newspaper. The al-
legedly defamatory publication, a full-page advertisement, solicited con-
tributions for "The Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the
Struggle for Freedom in the South."' 16 Consisting largely of editorial
commentary about the mistreatment of Dr. King and negro student
protesters by the police and the community, the advertisement con-
tained various minor inaccuracies.
17
The trial court found in favor of Sullivan and awarded him
$500,000. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.18 The
trial court's disposition was b,,sed in part on Alabama's defamation law
that allowed the jury to presume damages once it found the libelous
statement was made of and concerning the plaintiff.' 9
The Supreme Court reversed, holding Alabama's strict liability
standard constitutionally deficient because it failed to provide sufficient
safeguards for free speech and press, at least where a public official
brings a libel action against a critic of his official conduct. 20 In such
cases, the Court held, the speaker is entitled to a constitutional privilege
that is defeasible only upon plaintiff's proof that the defendant acted
with "actual malice."'2 1 Adopting a conditional privilege originally set
forth in Coleman v. MacLennan,22 the Court added constitutional armor
to the privilege and limited its use to the "good-faith" criticism of public
officials.
Emphasizing society's need for vigorous debate on public issues,
the New York Times Court recognized that certain inaccuracies are inevi-
table in the free exchange of ideas. Some erroneous statements, there-
fore, must be constitutionally protected in order to provide the
"breathing space" essential to the survival of free expression. 23 Accord-
ingly, the Court rejected Sullivan's argument that the advertisement
should be denied first amendment protection because of its factual er-
rors, its defamatory content, or the combination of these two
16. Id. at 257.
17. Id. The advertisement stated that police had "ringed the Alabama State College
Campus" when in fact they had merely been deployed in large numbers nearby. It also
asserted that Dr. King had been arrested seven times, when in fact he had been arrested on
only four occasions.
18. New York Times v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
19. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 262.
20. Id. at 264.
21. Id. at 279-80. To prove "actual malice," the plaintiff must show that defendant
acted with "knowledge that [the defamatory statement] was false or [made] with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."
22. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). The Kansas Supreme Court determined that privi-
lege carries a good faith requirement and "extends to a great variety of subjects and in-
cludes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office." Id. at 285. The
privilege is qualified to the extent that plaintiff must "show actual malice, or go remedi-
less." Id.
23. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
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elements.
24
New York Times involved the criticism of a public official in his official
capacity. The Court based its decision on the premise that punishing
seditious libel was repugnant to the first amendment value that citizens
should be allowed to openly criticize their government. 25 A noted com-
mentator, Professor Harry Kalven 2 6 predicted the expansion of this
privilege shortly after the New York Times decision. Kalven cautioned,
however, that "the invitation to follow a dialectic progression from pub-
lic official to government policy.., to matters in the public domain, like
art, seems to me to be overwhelming."
2 7
B. The Expansion of New York Times
The United States Supreme Court did in fact follow this progres-
sion. In the same year that New York Times was decided, the Court ex-
tended the revolutionary "actual malice" standard to a criminal libel
case. In Garrison v. Louisiana,28 the Court held that the Constitution
limits a state's power to impose criminal sanctions upon critics of a pub-
lic official's conduct. Again resting its decision on the foundation that
punishing seditious libel offends the first amendment, 29 the Court reit-
erated the need for free debate on public issues. Even where the utter-
ance is false, the Court observed that the constitutional protections of
free expression preclude the imposition of civil or criminal liability upon
any utterance that is not knowingly or recklessly false.30
Garrison also restated from New York Times a supporting rationale for
extending a privilege to speech critical of a public official's conduct.
The Court noted that "federal officers enjoy an absolute privilege for
defamatory publication within the scope of official duty, regardless of
the existence of malice in the sense of ill will," and that to deny critics of
official conduct a corresponding privilege "would give public servants
an unjustified preference over the public."'
'a
In a concurring opinion, Justices Douglas and Black repeated the
view they expressed in the New York Times' concurrence, that the Consti-
tution requires that the freedom to criticize official conduct be absolute,
and that by allowing the possibility of sanction for seditious libel where
the plaintiff can prove "actual malice" the decision violated the first
amendment.
3 2
The Court continued its expansion of the New York Times standard in
24. Id. at 273.
25. See id. at 276-77.
26. Kalven, a Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, has been described as
New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan's "most prominent interpreter." N. ROSENBERG, supra
note 1 at 245.
27. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note On "The Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 221.
28. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
29. Id. at 67; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 73.
31. Id. at 74.
32. Id. at 79 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring).
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Rosenblatt v. Baer,33 by applying the "public official" designation to rela-
tively low-ranking government employees.3 4 With respect to the New
York Times standard, the Court held that the term "public official" ap-
plies to those governmental employees "who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct
of governmental affairs."
'35
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker,36 the
Court went even further, extending the New York Times standard beyond
public officials to encompass "public figures" as well. Although neither
plaintiff was a public official, the Court held that they could not recover
without a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an ex-
treme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordi-
narily adhered to by responsible publishers."' 3 7 It reasoned that as
public figures involved in matters of "public interest,"'3 8 the plaintiffs
had access to adequate means of counter-argument, and thus the ability
to expose the falsity of the speech against them through public discus-
sion. 39 This policy consideration, the ability of the plaintiff to defend
his reputation, was an essential part of the Court's prior decisions re-
garding the standards necessary to protect the plaintiff. Such policy
considerations are the natural consequence of the Court's recognition
that the first amendment requires that free speech and an individual's
interest in his reputation coexist.
Butts and Walker marked the Court's departure from the govern-
mental criticism basis for consitutional protection and the inception of a
trend toward creating a privilege for speech involving "matters of public
or general interest."'40 Significantly, the Court also manifested its intent
to shift another aspect of defamation analysis. The Court stated that the
proper focus is upon the editorial process that creates the publication
and not simply upon the falsity of its content.
4 1
Dealing a nearly fatal blow to the protection of private figure plain-
tiffs defamed by the media, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.42 the Court
advanced the New York Times standard to the extremes foretold by Pro-
fessor Kalven. 4 3 George Rosenbloom, a magazine distributor, sued a
radio station which broadcasted news stories characterizing his books as
obscene and labeling him as a "smut distributor" and "girlie book ped-
33. 383 U.s. 75 (1966).
34. Id. The plaintiff, Frank Baer, supervised a county recreation area and reported to
the county commissioners.
35. Id. at 85.
36. 388 U.S. 130 (1967)(cases consolidated).
37. Id. at 155.
38. Butts was a state university's athletic director. Id. at 135-36. Walker was a retired
Army general. Id. at 140.
39. Id. at 155 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
40. 388 U.S. at 154-55.
41. Id. at 152-53.
42. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
43. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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dler.' ' 44 The trial court awarded Rosenbloom $250,000, 4 5 but the court
of appeals reversed.4 6 Refusing to allow Rosenbloom's non-public fig-
ure status to assume controlling significance, 4 7 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit cited Time, Inc. v. Hill.48 In Hill, the
Court embraced the rationale that "[a] broadly defined freedom of the
press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open soci-
ety,"' 49 and applied the New York Times standard to false reporting of
"matters of public interest" in an action for invasion of privacy. 50 De-
spite the fact that the plaintiff in Hill was a private individual, the Court
accorded the defendant publisher the same constitutional privilege that
the New York Times defendants enjoyed in publishing statements con-
cerning a public official.
5 '
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the plaintiff
was not a public official or a public figure, the New York Times privilege
applied to protect the publication or broadcast of "matters of public or
general interest." 5 2 By eliminating the distinction between private and
public plaintiffs, the Court gave the media virtual "carte blanche" to
publish defamatory material, 53 due to its strong propensity to classify an
almost unlimited range of matters as "of public interest."
54
Rosenbloom represented an extreme departure from the basis on
which the New York Times privilege was originally founded and estab-
lished the "matter of public interest" standard for constitutional protec-
tion which has proven difficult to apply. 55 In its zeal to prevent press
self-censorship, the Rosenbloom plurality gave short shrift to the protec-
tion of individual reputational interests, even to the point of stating that
the first amendment protects the mass media from "[tihe very possibility
of having to engage in litigation."
'56
44. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 36.
45. Thejury originally awarded $25,000 in general damages and $725,000 in punitive
damages. The court reduced the punitive damages award to $250,000 on remittitur.
46. 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969).
47. Id. at 896.
48. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
49. Id. at 389.
50. Id. at 387-88.
51. However, in citing the Hill Court's refusal to distinguish the plaintiff from Sullivan
in New York Times, the Third Circuit apparently ignored the dictum in Hill acknowledging
that "[w]ere this a libel action, the distinction ... between the relative opportunities of the
public official and the private individual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane
and the additional state interest in the protection of the individual against damage to his
reputation would be involved." Id. at 391.
52. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
53. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 206 (1976).
54. See id. at 206-07.
55. Id. In our society, the media decide what is to be a matter of public concern, and
courts have shown scant interest in second-guessing that determination. As Justice Mar-
shall noted in his dissent, all human events are arguably within the area of "public or
general concern." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52-53. The quoted observation was made in response to
the suggestion of the dissenters, Justices Harlan and Marshall, that a negligence standard
and an "actual damages" limitation would strike the proper balance.
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Disturbed by this extension of the constitutional privilege to all
matters of public interest, one commentator argued that Rosenbloom ef-
fectively destroyed the common law of defamation and concluded:
"The line of cases which began with New York Times v. Sullivan has come
to an end. The courts have no where to go after the decision in Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia."
'57
C. The Gertz Decision
Rosenbloom commanded the votes of only three Justices, 58 and lasted
only three years. In 1974, the Court decided Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 59
and abruptly aborted the evolution of a system in which "the great bulk
of material contained in the press-far more than merely matters rele-
vant to self-government-was subject to the Times privilege." '60 With
Gertz, the Court adopted an approach that re-established its recognition
of the reputational values without sacrificing first amendment freedoms.
Elmer Gertz, a prominent Chicago lawyer, brought a libel action
against the author and publisher of a magazine article describing him as
a communist involved in a campaign to discredit the police. 6 1 The trial
court ruled the publication libelous as a matter of law and withdrew
from the jury all issues except the measure of damages. 6 2 Although the
jury awarded Gertz $50,000, the trial court determined that the New York
Times privilege applied and entered judgment for defendants notwith-
standing the verdict. 63 The court of appeals affirmed on the basis of
Rosenbloom, holding that because the case before it involved a matter of
public interest, the New York Times standard was applicable. 64
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, rejecting Rosenbloom
because of its failure to adequately weigh the reputational interests of
private individuals against the freedoms of speech and press. 6 5 Articu-
lating a three-part formula designed to reach the proper balance of
these values, the Court held: (1) the Times standard applies to public
figures and officials but not to private figures even if those private
57. Note, The End of the Line: Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 734
(1970).
58. Only Justices Brennan, Burger, and Blackmun could wholly agree that the New
York Times standard of knowing or reckless falsity applied in a state civil libel action
brought by a private individual for a defamatory falsehood uttered in a radio broadcast
about the individual's involvement in an event of public or general interest. Rosenbloom,
403 U.S. at 30-32.
59. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
60. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 447 (1975).
61. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325-26.
62. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
63. Id. at 1000. The Court found insufficient evidence to show that there was actual
malice or reckless disregard for the truth. Id.
64. 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972) rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The court of appeals
doubted the correctness of the trial court's finding that plaintiff was not a public figure, but
reached the same result by applying the public interest test. Id. at 805, n.8.
65. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-47. Instead of balancing the competing interests, especially
with respect to the private plaintiff, the plurality adopted a one-sided approach favoring
the defendant.
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figures are involved in a matter of public interest;6 6 (2) the states may
define their own standard of liability with respect to private plaintiffs "so
long as they do not impose liability without fault;" 6 7 and (3) no plaintiff
may recover punitive damages unless the Times standard of knowing or
reckless falsity is met.
68
The Gertz decision benefited private plaintiffs by overruling the
"matter of public interest" test 6 9 prescribed by Rosenbloom, thereby
firmly establishing a distinction between private and public plaintiffs.
70
But the decision also imposed an additional burden on certain classes of
private figures. While in the past a private plaintiff not involved in a
matter of public interest could recover absent a showing of fault by the
publisher, Gertz abolished strict liability with respect to all plaintiffs.
This abolition was necessary, however, in order to avoid punishing the
media for publishing material whose accuracy was reasonably verified
and that was written in a conscientious manner.
Thus, Gertz marked the Court's return to a balancing approach. The
decision protected the media by requiring all plaintiffs to prove fault, yet
accommodated the private individual's reputational interests by refusing
to apply the Times standard to those who were not public officials or
public figures. The plaintiff, Elmer Gertz, recently noted that "in the
Gertz case, [the Court] backtracked and held that private persons had to
prove fault, as defined by state law, and actual injuries, as more broadly
defined."
7 1
D. The Falsity Issue
In the years between New York Times and Gertz, the Court established
various criteria for determining liability in defamation cases, but failed
to answer a key question pertinent to every defamation case: given that
66. Id. at 343.
67. Id. at 347. The Court found this to be true at least where "the substance of the
defamatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation apparent." Id. at 348 (quot-
ing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)).
68. Id. at 350.
69. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
70. The Court found two major reasons to distinguish private plaintiffs from public
officials or figures: first, public officials and public figures have greater access to the media
and hence a more realistic opportunity to rebut false statements. Second, public figures
and officials have chosen to seek the limelight or to influence government operations and
thus have more or less "assumed the risk" of inciting adverse commentary.
71. Gertz, The Law of Libel Continues to Develop-An Introduction, 90 DICK. L. R. 539, 541
(1986). Gertz added that
at this point, the matter seemed to rest until the plurality opinion in Dun & Brad-
street v. Greenmoss Builders, in which the majority held that Gertz was confined to
matters of public concern. In other words, private individuals not involved in
matters of public concern could recover under common law rules, so that neither
fault nor malice had to be proved in order to recover compensatory and punitive
damages for utterances of no public importance. The Court concluded by stating
that all expression is not entitled to the same first amendment protection-that
there are degrees of entitlement. If the defamatory utterance concerns matters
that are purely private then it is not protected by the Gertz rule.
Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985)).
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a defamatory statement must be false to be actionable, 72 who has the
burden of proving its truth or falsity? Prior to New York Times, truth,
together with privilege, was considered an absolute defense to a libel
action. 73 Once the Court introduced constitutional analysis to libel law,
however, the standards applied to determine which party had the bur-
den of proving truth or falsity became more difficult to determine.
In New York Times, the Court recognized that the defense of truth,
standing alone, was insufficient to protect free speech,74 and acknowl-
edged that some falsehoods, even those potentially defamatory, are con-
stitutionally protected. 75 Although nowhere in New York Times did the
Court expressly shift the burden of proving falsity to the plaintiff,76 the
application and discussion of New York Times in subsequent decisions in-
dicates that such a shift was apparently intended.
In Garrison v. Louisiana, Justice Brennan interpreted the New York
Times rule as requiring a public plaintiff to establish falsity as well as
"actual malice." 77 Similarly, in Greenbelt Publishing Association v. Bresler,7 8
Justice Stewart, relying on New York Times, emphasized that a public
plaintiff must show that the defamatory publication was "not only false
but was uttered with actual malice."' 79 Interpreting the rule became
even more difficult after the Court's dictum in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn.80 Having stated that truth is a defense to a libel action, Justice
White concluded that the defamed public plaintiff must prove falsity and
reckless disregard for truth or falsity.
8 1
The Court's attempts to describe the constitutional privilege reflect
the confusion over the "truth or falsity" burden that existed prior to
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.8 2 With the Hepps decision, the
Court has taken a significant step toward eliminating the confusion,
placing the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff in certain types of
defamation cases.
8 3
72. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 458 (1967).
73. See supra note 5.
74. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964).
75. Id. at 273.
76. The possibility of shifting the burden of proof as a means of protecting speech
was clear to Justice Brennan. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), he wrote that a
state may not place on a tax exemption applicant the burden of proving that he has not
engaged in criminal advocacy, because such a rule tended to cause self-censorship. Speiser
was cited liberally by Justice Brennan throughout New York Times, but for different pur-
poses. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271, 279, 285.
77. 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). Two commentators have observed that this burden of
proof requires a public official, at a minimum, to prove falsity. Arkin & Granquist, The
Presumption of General Damages in the Law of Constitutional Libel, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1490
n.58 (1968).
78. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
79. Id. at 8 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)).
80. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
81. Id. at 489-90 (dictum).
82. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
83. The decision placed the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff in cases where
the subject matter of the defamatory speech is of "public concern" and the defendant is a
member of the mass media.
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III. PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. HEPPS
A. Facts
Maurice Hepps was the principal stockholder of General Program-
ming, Inc., which owned the trademark to a chain of "Thrifty Beverage"
stores. Boasting an innovative concept in liquor sales and distribution,
General Programming licensed and provided management and consul-
tation services to the Thrifty stores. 8 4 When a bill introduced in the
Pennsylvania Legislature threatened to effect adversely the stores'
purchasing practices, Hepps engaged the assistance of a lobbyist in or-
der to defeat the measure. 85 The lobbyist, who was reputed to have
connections with organized crime, contacted State Senator Frank Maz-
zei. Mazzei opposed the bill, which never passed.8 6 On another occa-
sion, the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board suspended the Thrifty
stores' liquor licenses, alleging that the management agreements vio-
lated the liquor code.8 7 At Hepps' request, Senator Mazzei arranged a
meeting between Hepps and the Liquor Control Board's chief counsel,
Alexander Jaffurs. Jaffurs refused to attend this meeting and was dis-
charged shortly thereafter. Jaffurs publicly stated that he believed his
prosecution of Thrifty was a factor in his being fired.8 8
The defendant, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., publishes the Phila-
delphia Inquirer which published a series of five articles, authored by
defendants William Ecenbarger and William Lambert, stating that
Hepps' organization had connections with organized crime. The nature
of these articles was exemplified by one headline which read: "How
Mazzei Used Pull, Kept Beer Chain Intact."8 9 The articles alleged that
Mazzei had engaged in a clear pattern of interference with state govern-
ment on behalf of Hepps and Thrifty, and that Mazzei had several un-
derworld associates including Joseph Scalleat, whom Hepps had
engaged as a lobbyist. 90 Based on these articles, Hepps, General Pro-
gramming, Inc., and several of its franchisees that were engaged in dis-
tribution of beer and other beverages filed an action for libel in May
1976.
B. Decisions Below
Noting that a Pennsylvania statute placed the burden of proving the
truth of defamatory statements on libel defendants, 9 1 the trial court con-
84. Brief for Appellee at 2, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558
(1986) (No. 84-1491).




88. Id. at 6.
89. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 3 Pa. D. & C.3d 693, 695 (1977).
90. Id.
91. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343(b)(1) (1982) provides:
"In an action for defamation, the defendant has the burden of proving, when the
issue is properly raised: (1) The truth of the defamatory communication."
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cluded that the statute violated the federal Constitution and instructed
the jury that plaintiffs bore the burden of proving falsity.9 2 After a six-
week trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded, holding that the statute met the Gertz fault requirement and
that fault could be proved without proving falsity.93 The court inter-
preted Gertz and subsequent cases to mean that the only restraint upon
the states mandated by the first amendment in private figure defamation
actions, was the prohibition against imposing liability without fault. Re-
jecting the trial court's instruction that plaintiff bore the burden of prov-
ing falsity, the court stated that to allow such a requirement would
"condone . .. irresponsible conduct by the media."' 94
C. The United States Supreme Court Holding
Not persuaded by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's disposition,
the United States Supreme Court held that "where a newspaper pub-
lishes speech of public concern, a private figure plaintiff cannot recover
damages without also showing that the statements at issue are false." 9 5
Even where the plaintiff's burden is escalated by a "shield law" such as
Pennsylvania's, 96 the Court found no reason to apply a different consti-
tutional standard.
97
The Court reasoned that because it is impossible to determine
whether speech is true or false in every case, the Constitution requires
the scales to be tipped in favor of protecting true speech.9 8 To ensure
that on matters of public concern true speech is not chilled, the defend-
ant cannot be required to guarantee the truth of all of his factual asser-
tions. As a result, the common law presumption that defamatory speech
is false must yield to the first amendment policy that encourages free
debate on public issues. 9 9
The Court acknowledged that plaintiffs defamed by false statements
which they are unable to demonstrate are false will be unable to recover
under this decision. This consideration, however, is outweighed by the
need to protect free speech and tempered by the realization that placing
the burden on either party will occasionally result in injustice.' 0 0
92. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374, 377 (1984).
93. Id. at 312, 485 A.2d at 385.
94. Id. at 312, 485 A.2d at 386.
95. 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1559 (1986).
96. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part: "No person ...
employed by any newspaper of general circulation... or any radio or television station, or
any magazine of general circulation . . . shall be required to disclose the source of any
information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding, trial, or investi-
gation before any government unit."
97. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1565.
98. Id. at 1564.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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D. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justices Brennan and Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion,' 0 ' as-
serting that the Court erroneously limited its holding to media defend-
ants. Arguing that no distinction should be made with respect to the
type of defendant involved, the concurrence emphasized that the first
amendment protects all speech, and that the inherent worth of an ex-
pression does not depend on its source.102
Justices Stevens, Burger, White and Rehnquist joined in a vigorous
dissenting opinion, 10 3 arguing that the majority devalued the state's in-
terest in redressing harm to an individual's reputation. Because the
Hepps decision would have a practical effect only where the speaker
meets the Gertz fault requirement, the decision protects speech made
negligently or maliciously. Such speech does not deserve protection,
the dissent asserted, as it contributes little to the "marketplace of
ideas."'
0 4
The dissenters quoted Time, Inc. v. Firestone,'0 5 in which the Court
stated that when the publisher is at fault through malicious or careless
publication of defamatory material, the public interest in uninhibited
speech is "at its nadir" and society's need to redress such utterances is
"at its zenith."' 0 6 If the plaintiff cannot prove the falsity of statements,
the dissent reasoned that permitting the intentional and malicious publi-
cation of libelous material allows a publisher to act as a "character
assassin [with a] constitutional license to defame."' 1 7 Uncomfortable
with the deterioration of the distinction between private and public
plaintiffs, the dissent protested that Hepps was a throwback to the Rosen-
bloom era. 108
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Shift Toward a New Standard of Liability
The recurrent theme of Supreme Court defamation cases decided
since New York Times centers on the defendant's culpability. This empha-
sis on culpability is evidence of the Court's realization that because of its
antagonism toward the interests protected by the first amendment, defa-
mation is a special kind of tort. The tension between defamation and
the first amendment arises because the constitutional protection of the
tortfeasor is a pervasive issue and the sanction for defamation invades a
fundamental right.
101. Id. at 1565.
102. Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1567.
105. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
106. Id. at 456.
107. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1568 n.6.
108. Id. at 1571 (criticizing the reinstitution of the "matter of public interest"
standard).
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The New York Times decision planted the seed for Hepps, both in its
realization that some falsehoods must enjoy constitutional protection 109
and in its recognition that requiring a speaker to guarantee the truth of
factual assertions leads to "self-censorship"' 10 that inhibits free speech.
Because of New York Times, the defamatory falsehood began to lose its
inherent actionability, and the conduct or intent of the speaker assumed
a paramount role in determining liability. The Hepps decision fits con-
sistently into this theme of culpability, squarely placing the burden of
proving falsity, an essential element of fault, on the plaintiff."I '
The Court's analysis of defamation liability since NewYork Times has
shifted in focus from the effect of the defamatory speech-strict liabil-
ity-to the cause of the speech-fault requirement. Mandated by the
Constitution's zealous protection of free expression, this shift pro-
ceeded without addressing the burden of proving falsity until the
Court's decision in Hepps.
With the advent of the Hepps decision, the Court has removed a sig-
nificant obfuscation from a complex and confusing area of law. The de-
cision flows logically from the rationale behind the Court's recent
defamation decisions, 1 2 particularly the Gertz abolition of strict liability
in such actions. After Gertz, the Hepps conclusion was inevitable: even a
private figure plaintiff must prove falsity in order to prevail in a defama-
tion action against the mass media.
B. The Relationship Between Fault and Falsity
Gertz established that although a private figure plaintiff need not
meet the demanding New York Times standard, he must at least show fault
on the part of the publisher of the defamatory communication.' 1 3 The
Court has also acknowledged that "demonstration that an article was
true would seem to preclude finding the publisher at fault." ' ' 4 It would
appear to follow that if fault involves the elements of carelessness and
falsity," 5 the publisher of a true statement cannot fully meet the criteria
to support a finding that he was "at fault."
This conclusion is similar to that reached by commentators Franklin
and Bussel: "Because fault with respect to falsity is the constitutional
rule, a showing of falsity in Gertz cases is the logical predicate to satisfy-
ing the constitutional test.""16 Even if one argues that such a conclu-
sion does not require that the plaintiff prove falsity as part of his prima
facie case, it is undeniable that the converse, requiring the defendant to
prove truth, offends the principle set forth in Gertz.
109. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
110. Id. at 279.
I1. Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 1981)
(fault consists of two elements, carelessness and falsity).
112. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
113. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
114. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 458 (1976).
115. Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co., 642 F.2d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 1981).
116. Franklin and Bussell, supra note 6, at 857.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
The practical effect of shifting the burden of proof is most evident
when ajury is undecided. In a close case, a presumption of falsity forces
the undecided jury to find for the plaintiff. Even if the media defendant
published a true statement, it could possibly be held liable if it were
unable to prove the statement true. Thus, the very evil Gertz sought to
extinguish, liability without fault, may ensue if the plaintiff is not re-
quired to prove falsity. 1
7
Arguing that the Gertz fault requirement already provided an ade-
quate safeguard, the Hepps dissent asserted that the decision would pre-
vent plaintiffs from recovering where they could prove fault, such as
carelessness or common law malice, but not falsity. 1 8 However, be-
cause true statements are not actionable, one must prove falsity to prove
fault. Even a carelessly or maliciously printed article enjoys constitu-
tional protection if it is true. 1 19 Furthermore, the dissent's scenario of a
vindictive publisher knowingly printing an unprovably false story to pur-
posely injure a plaintiff, 120 at the risk of career destruction and financial
ruin, seems highly speculative.
C. The Problem With Presuming Falsity
In addition to permitting liability without fault in close cases, the
presumption of falsity was rightly abolished by Hepps as an ancient relic
which has outlived its underlying justification. The presumption
originated at common law, with an approach to the concept of truth that
has been characterized as "nothing short of schizophrenic."' 2' While
most authorities agreed that falsity was a required element in a defama-
tion action, 122 the bulk of common law decisions assert that truth is
merely an affirmative defense, implying that falsity is not a prerequisite
to liability. 123 As Philadelphia Newspapers argued in its brief, there is
no particular rational connection between the presumption's proved
fact, that a defamatory statement was made, and the presumed fact that
the statement was false.
124
The plaintiffs in Hepps argued that where a man's reputation is con-
cerned, he should be "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This
117. Scrips-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d at 375; see also Schauer, Language, Truth,
and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263, 277 (1978)
(incorrect determination may improperly deny first amendment protection).
118. 106 S. Ct. at 1566 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Cf. Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1236 (1976)
(admitting that in an exceptional case, fault requirement would fail to fix liability on a
defendant who published what he believed to be false and defamatory matter that actually
proved to be true).
120. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1568 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. B. SANFORD supra note 9 at § 6.2.1. (conflicting requirements provide that a de-
famatory statement must be false for plaintiff to recover yet maintain that truth is an af-
firmative defense thereby implying that falsity is not a prerequisite to liability).
122. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4 § 116.
123. B. SANFORD, supra note 9 at § 6.2.1.
124. Brief for Appellant at 33, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1588
(1986) (No. 84-1491) (citing Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371
(6th Cir. 1981)).
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rationale supported the presumption of falsity shared by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co. 125 This view,
however, was established in the criminal context. The underlying justifi-
cation, preventing an innocent defendant from being punished if his
guilt is uncertain, hardly justifies awarding a libel plaintiff possibly stag-
gering damages if he is unable to fully convince a jury of falsity.
Shifting from the presumption of falsity, therefore, was a logical
step for the Hepps Court, and was consistent with the Gertz shift away
from presumed damages. Both changes reflect the Court's recognition
of the vital need to continue the trend away from strict liability in defa-
mation actions.
D. The Threat of Self-Censorship
The purpose of the New York Times privilege was to minimize the
threat to the media of libel judgments, 12 6 which encourage self-censor-
ship and hinder "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public
issues. 12 7 In New York Times, the Court realized that a certain number of
inaccuracies are inevitable in the free interchange of ideas and devel-
oped a principle which planted the seed for the Hepps decision. As the
New York Times Court observed: "A rule compelling the critic of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so
on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads to com-
parable 'self-censorship.' "128
Although the protection has since been extended beyond criticism
of official conduct, the underlying need to avoid self-censorship still ap-
plies. The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Hepps, which placed the bur-
den of proving truth on the defendant, attempted to establish precisely
the type of rule proscribed by New York Times and its progeny. By virtu-
ally requiring a defendant to guarantee the truth of his assertions, the
statute clearly violated the constitutionally-based principles discussed by
the Court since New York Times. Without eliminating defamation actions
altogether, these decisions have significantly reduced the likelihood that
judges and juries, through the advice of media counsel, will prescribe
what the press may or may not publish.
E. The Uncertain Balance as to Truth or Falsity
That all defamatory statements do not readily lend themselves to an
accurate determination of their truth or falsity is an inescapable fact.
Because no "litmus paper" test for truth exists, some speech will inevita-
bly be unprovable. Conscious of our system's fallibility, the Court de-
cided that since occasional errors will occur, the Constitution requires
courts to risk denying recovery to deserving plaintiffs for unprovably
125. 441 Pa. 432, 447, 273 A.2d 899, 910 (1971) (the defense of privilege, which ne-
gates the malice requirement is not affected by the underlying presumption of falsity).
126. Anderson, supra note 60, at 425.
127. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
128. Id. at 279.
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false statements, rather than punishing media defendants for publishing
unprovable truth.129 This conclusion makes sense. In much the same
way that our system's revulsion for punishing the innocent tips the bal-
ance in favor of criminal defendants, our system's infatuation with free
speech tips the balance in favor of defamation defendants. Undeniably,
"[t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in or-
der to protect speech that matters."' 3
0
Furthermore, the plaintiff in a defamation action should be in a bet-
ter position than the defendant to test the truth of a statement made
about himself. 131 While the defendant derives his information from sec-
ond-hand sources, the plaintiff necessarily knows whether a statement
made about him is true or false. Thus, it would appear that the plaintiff
has an advantage in gathering evidence to support his case. Even in
jurisdictions with a shield law in effect, this advantage is not significantly
impaired. While the plaintiff may be hindered from attacking the credi-
bility of the defendant's source, he fully retains his ability to dispute the
actual substance of the statement.'
3 2
V. CONCLUSION
New York Times brought the concept of culpability into the law of
defamation, freeing the media defendant from its compulsion to avoid
statements unflattering to public officials. Upon this foundation, the
Gertz Court extended the fault requirement to private plaintiffs, yet pro-
tected their reputational interests by refusing to require that they meet
the Times standard. The Hepps decision-constructed on the premise
that the first amendment forbids the punishment of speech, either civilly
or criminally, unless the speaker is culpable in some way-has served to
further solidify this framework. Consistent with the constitutionally
mandated shift of the Court's focus, Hepps is a logical and illuminating
product of the New York Times revolution.
Marian L. Carlson
129. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1563-64.
130. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
131. Keeton, supra note 119, at i236.
132. While it may be argued that it is difficult to prove a negative, not all negatives are
difficult to prove. A detailed defamatory statement should be readily discredited. Franklin
and Bussell, supra note 6, at 860-61.
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